Product liability in England and Wales by Oliphant, Ken & Wilcox, Vanessa
                          Oliphant, K., & Wilcox, V. (2016). Product liability in England and Wales.
In P. Machnikowski (Ed.), European product liability: an analysis of the
sState of the art in the era of new technologies (pp. 173-204). (Principles of
European Tort Law). Cambridge: Intersentia.
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
License (if available):
CC BY-NC-SA
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
This contribution was originally 
published in: 
 
European Product Liability 
 
Piotr Machnikowski (ed.) 
 
Published in August 2016 
by Intersentia www.intersentia.co.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For more information on the book or to purchase 
http://intersentia.com/en/european-product-liability.html 
 
 
This contribution is made available under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution, NonCommercial, ShareAlike Creative Commons Licence (https://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited 
and derived works are published under the same licence.  
 
For any queries, or for commercial re-use, please contact Intersentia at 
mail@intersentia.co.uk or on +44 (0) 1223 370170. 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Featured Recommendations 
 
The Liability of Public Authority in 
Comparative Perspective 
Ken Oliphant (ed.) 
Principles of European Tort Law series 
October 2016 
ISBN 978-1-78068-238-9 
xiv + 888 pp. 
 
Responsibility, Restoration and 
Fault 
Bénédict Winiger 
forthcoming June 2017 
ISBN 978-1-78068-476-5 
approx. 120 pp. 
 
The Borderlines of Tort Law: 
Interactions with Contract Law 
Miquel Martin-Casals (ed.) 
Principles of European Tort Law series 
forthcoming October 2017 
ISBN 978-1-78068-248-8 
approx. 500 pp. 
 
Regulating Risk Through Private 
Law 
Matthew Dyson (ed.) 
forthcoming September 2017 
ISBN 978-1-78068-479-6 
approx. 560 pp. 
Intersentia 173
PRODUCT LIABILITY 
IN ENGLAND AND WALES
Ken Oliphant and Vanessa Wilcox
I. Sources of Law and Th eir Evolution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  174
A. Pre-Directive 85/374/EEC Rights and Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  174
1) An Action in Tort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  174
2) An Action in Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  174
B. Implementing Directive 85/374/EEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  175
C. Scope of the Consumer Protection Act 1987  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  177
D. Impact of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 on Existing 
Rights and Remedies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  178
E. Special Liability Regimes for New Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  179
II. Basic Elements of Liability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  181
A. Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  181
B. Product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  182
C. Defect  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  184
D. Marketing of Product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  186
E. Producer’s Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  186
F. Special Products  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  187
G. Standard of Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  187
III. Th e Person Liable for the Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  188
IV. Th e Aggrieved Person and Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  189
V. Causality  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  191
VI. Defences and Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  193
VII. Remedies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  195
VIII. Procedural and Evidential Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  196
IX. Alternative Regulations and Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  197
A. Consequences of Pursuing Domestic Remedies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  197
B. Duty to Recall  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  200
C. Social Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  202
D. Criminal Off ences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  202
E. Administrative Law  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  203
X. Assessment of Domestic Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  203
Ken Oliphant and Vanessa Wilcox
174 Intersentia
I. SOURCES OF LAW AND THEIR EVOLUTION
A. PRE-DIRECTIVE 85/374/EEC RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
01 Prior to the implementation of Directive 85/374/EEC a victim of a product 
defect could bring himself within one or more of several legal categories, all of 
which continue to exist today. In particular, an action lay in tort and contract, 
and criminal consequences could also follow.
1) An Action in Tort
02 It was in the spring of 1932 that the (then) House of Lords handed down 
judgment in what would arguably become the most famous case in the common 
law: Donoghue v Stevenson.1 Th eir Lordships ruled there that the manufacturer 
of any article, apart entirely from contract, owes a duty to its ‘neighbour’ – on 
the facts, the ultimate consumer of a bottle of ginger beer – to take reasonable 
care to ensure that the article is carefully produced. Th e case created the modern 
concept of negligence, the most common basis of litigation in tort. Tort’s appeal 
lay in its extension to persons other than the actual ultimate purchaser, the drink 
in Donoghue v Stevenson having been paid for by the claimant’s friend. Its major 
disadvantage, however, was and remains the need to prove negligence. Daniels 
and Daniels v R White & Sons Ltd and Tarbard2 – a case that arose subsequently 
– is illustrative of the diffi  culties that inhered in framing one’s action in tort. Th e 
facts, personal injury arising from a defective bottle of lemonade, relate closely 
to those in Donoghue v Stevenson, but the claim against the manufacturer in tort 
failed in Daniels and Daniels since the manufacturer was found to have adopted 
a ‘fool-proof method of cleaning, washing and fi lling bottles’3 and eff ectively 
supervised the process so that the presence in the bottle of 38 grains of carbolic 
acid could not have been attributed to its negligence.
2) An Action in Contract
03 A right of action founded on breach of contract co-existed alongside that in 
tort. However, the former action was and is of course limited to instances where 
there is a direct contractual relationship between the parties (cf  the position 
under the Contracts (Rights of Th ird Parties) Act 1999, discussed in no 75). Th us, 
despite the fact that ‘[b]oth husband and wife drank almost simultaneously’4 
in Daniels and Daniels above, while Mr Daniels succeeded against the retailer, 
1 [1932] AC 562. Cf Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M&W 109.
2 [1938] 4 All ER 258.
3 [1938] 4 All ER 258, 262 per Lewis J.
4 [1938] 4 All ER 258, 260 per Lewis J.
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the absence of privity was fatal to Mrs Daniels’ action.5 Mr Daniels’ claim was 
based on implied conditions as to quality or fi tness of goods sold in the course 
of a business under sec 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (now sec 14 of the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979 and in the case of an agreement between a trader and a 
consumer, as on the facts in Daniels and Daniels, secs 9 and 10 of the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015, which entered into force on 1  October 2015). In addition, an 
action lies, inter alia, for breach of sec 13 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (implied 
term in sales by description; now sec 11 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
in the case of consumers) which states that goods are to be sold as described. 
Equivalent terms also exist in respect of hire-purchase agreements6 and other 
contracts.7 Th e legislature has also stepped in to ensure that the above implied 
terms, among others, cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any 
contract term as against a person dealing as a consumer.8 Despite the mentioned 
drawback of privity, an action in contract benefi ts from the fact that, in contrast 
to tort, fault generally need not be proved. Moreover, all reasonably foreseeable 
damage, whether to persons, property or pocket, is compensable.
B. IMPLEMENTING DIRECTIVE 85/374/EEC
04 Th e inadequacies inherent in the existing causes of action led to huge 
debates in the USA and the changes eff ected there fed into discussions in the 
UK, as well as infl uencing the European legal landscape. Around the time when 
the Council of Europe was setting out the terms of what would become the 
European Convention on Products Liability,9 which sought to introduce a strict 
product liability regime into Europe, Britain was still coming to terms with the 
thalidomide disaster. A Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation 
for Personal Injury, under the leadership of Lord Pearson, sat to consider the 
law relating to compensation for personal injury caused, inter alia, ‘through 
the manufacture, supply or use of goods or services’.10 Th is was followed by 
consultations and subsequent recommendations by the English and Scottish 
Law Commissions whose terms of reference, insofar as protected interests were 
5 Cf Priest v Last [1903] 2 KB 148 where the claimant recovered expenses incurred in the 
treatment of his wife for the injury occasioned to her by the use of a hot-water bottle he had 
purchased.
6 Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973, sec 9 f. Th e Consumer Rights Act 2015 also covers 
hire-purchase agreements between traders and consumers: sec 3(2)(c).
7 Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, secs 3 f and 9 f. Th e Consumer Rights Act 2015 also covers 
contracts between traders and consumers for the hire and transfer of goods (sec 3(2)(b) and (d)) 
and contracts for the supply of digital content (Chapter 3) and services (Chapter 4).
8 Formerly regulated under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; now contained in sec 31 of the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 in the case of consumer contracts. See also Consumer Rights Act 
2015, secs 47 and 57, and Part 2.
9 CETS No 091. Strasbourg, 27.01.1977.
10 (1978) Cmnd 7054, vol 1, Ch 22 (para 1193).
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concerned, were much broader than those of the Pearson Commission.11 As the 
above investigations coincided with the European Commission’s preliminary 
draft  directive for defective products, which was eventually adopted as Directive 
85/374/EEC, the English and Scottish Law Commissions’ work came to naught. 
Instead, Directive 85/374/EEC was implemented by way of Part I of the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987 (CPA). Part I of the Act entered into force on 1 March 1988. 
Directive 85/374/EEC was subsequently amended by Directive 1999/34/EC and the 
changes required by it were given eff ect to in the Consumer Protection Act 1987 
(Product Liability) (Modifi cation) Order 2000 (see no 06 below).12 Section  1(1) 
of the CPA expressly provides that the Act shall be construed to comply with 
the Directive. Although criticised,13 at least one judge has ruled that ‘insofar as 
the wording of the CPA … diff ers from the equivalent Articles in the Directive, 
it should not be construed diff erently from the Directive; and consequently the 
practical course [is] to go straight to the fount, the Directive itself.’14
05 Directive 85/374/EEC allowed Member States options in three areas: fi rst, 
they could, by way of derogation, provide in their legislation that a ‘product’ 
under art  2 also meant primary agricultural products and game: art  15(1)(a); 
second, they could derogate from the development risk defence under art  7(e) 
which allows a producer to escape liability where the state of scientifi c and 
technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was 
not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered: art  15(1)(b); 
and fi nally, they could limit a producer’s total liability for damage resulting from 
a death or personal injury to an amount which may not be less than 70 million 
ECU: art 16(1). How the UK exercised these options is set out below.
06 First, like the Directive, the UK adopted a vague defi nition of ‘product’ 
under sec 1(2) of the CPA: ‘product’ means any goods or electricity and includes 
a product which is comprised in another product, whether by virtue of being a 
component part or raw material or otherwise. Moreover, ‘product’ extended to 
things subjected to ‘an industrial or other process’: sec 1(2)(c). Th e UK did not 
derogate from art 2 of the Directive so that only processed primary agricultural 
products and game were caught. As former sec 2(4) stated, the CPA did not apply 
‘to a person in respect of any defect in any game or agricultural produce if the 
only supply of the game or produce by that person to another was at a time when 
it had not undergone an industrial process.’ Liability for processed food did 
not attach to the primary producer, therefore, but to the processor and, where 
applicable, the producer of the fi nal product, ie ‘the fruit pulp producer and fruit 
11 Liability for Defective Products (1977) Cmnd 6831.
12 Statutory Instrument 2000 No 2771.
13 A Arnull, Product Liability and the Eff ect of Directives (2001) 26 European Law Review 213, 214.
14 A v Th e National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289, at [2] per Burton J.
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pie maker but not the fruit grower’.15 As mentioned in no 04 above, Directive 
1999/34/EC (in its art 1(2)) eventually amended Directive 85/374/EEC to extend 
the scope of the provisions of the latter Directive to primary agricultural products 
and game, whether processed or otherwise, as a result of concerns over BSE 
(bovine spongiform encephalopathy). Th is change was implemented by the 
Consumer Protection Act 1987 (Product Liability) (Modifi cation) Order 2000, 
which entered into force on 4 December 2000. Article 2(3) of the Order provides 
for the omission of sec 2(4) from the CPA.
07 Second, the UK chose not to exclude the development risk defence, which 
is laid down in sec 4(1)(e) of the CPA. Th e provision, which was subject to an 
unsuccessful challenge by the European Commission, reads that it shall be 
a defence for the producer ‘that the state of scientifi c and technical knowledge 
at the relevant time was not such that a producer of products of the same 
description as the product in question might be expected to have discovered the 
defect if it had existed in his products while they were under his control’. Th e 
Commission had argued unsuccessfully that, unlike the relevant article of the 
Directive, which calls for an objective assessment, sec 4(1)(e) of the CPA depends 
on the subjective knowledge of a producer taking reasonable care.16 Th e defence 
is given fuller treatment in no 64 below.
08 Th ird, the UK declined to impose a ceiling on liability. In response to the 
Commission’s Green Paper on Liability for Defective Products,17 the UK said 
that it continued in its belief that setting such a limit could lead to injustices in 
cases with multiple claims on the one hand and lengthy delays in the payment of 
compensation awards where there is a possibility of further claims in respect of 
the same products on the other.18
C. SCOPE OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1987
09 Th e UK legislature adopted a mixed bag approach insofar as transposing 
the 1985 Directive was concerned: (i) some aspects of the Directive are given 
eff ect in the CPA; (ii) the CPA also delegates issues encompassed in the 1985 
Directive to certain enactments; (iii) as it does issues not encompassed in the 
Directive but nevertheless related to product liability; and fi nally (iv) some issues 
are left  to general principles of national law. In particular:
15 J Stapleton, Product Liability (1994) 304.
16 Case C-300/95 Commission v United Kingdom [1997] ECR I-2649.
17 COM(1999)396 fi nal.
18 United Kingdom response to the Commission’s Green Paper on Liability for Defective 
Products, 15  January 2014, Ares(2014)74687, 4 <http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/
1496/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/pdf>.
Ken Oliphant and Vanessa Wilcox
178 Intersentia
(i) Th e core sections of the 1987 insofar as defective products are concerned 
are secs 1–7. Section 1 sets out the purpose and construction of Part I of 
the 1987 Act (including the defi nition of ‘product’). Th is corresponds with 
art 2 of the Directive; sec 2 defi nes who may be liable (corresponding with 
arts  1 and 3), and it lays down the rule of liability in the case of multiple 
tortfeasors (implementing art 5) and expressly states that a claim under the 
Directive operates without prejudice to other rights and remedies (enacting 
art 13). Th e meaning of ‘defect’ is dealt with under sec 3 (cf art 6), available 
civil defences are enumerated in sec 4 (cf art  7) and damage is defi ned in 
sec 5 (cf  art  9). Th e prohibition on exclusions from liability under sec 7 
corresponds with art 12.
(ii) Section 6 deals with the application of certain enactments and in particular 
sec 6(8) – on nuclear installations – fi nds its equivalent in art  14 of the 
Directive. Th e short- and long-stop limitation periods set out in arts 10 and 11 
of the Directive respectively are not given eff ect in the 1987 Act itself, but 
rather the Directive precipitated an amendment to the Limitation Act 1980 
which since then has regulated actions in respect of defective products under 
the thereby inserted sec 11A.19 Articles 5 and 8 of the Directive refer to the 
preservation of national law concerning the right of contribution or recourse 
(which is regulated by the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978). In line 
with art 8(2) of the Directive, on contributory negligence, sec 6(4) CPA refers 
to the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. Under art 9 of the 
Directive, damage includes damage caused by death, an issue dealt with 
under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976.
(iii) As mentioned, the CPA also deals with the application of certain enactments 
not expressly covered by the Directive, including the Congenital Disability 
(Civil Liability) Act 1976. Suffi  ce to say at this stage that the eff ect of the 
section is to fl esh out the liability element of those provisions in respect of 
claims arising in the context of defective products.
(iv) General principles of national law are left  to govern certain issues such as 
causation, the quantum of damages, procedure (including the burden of 
proof (cf art 4)) and the calculation of interest payable.
D. IMPACT OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1987 
ON EXISTING RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
10 In practice, relatively few claims are brought under the 1987 Act (see 
no 86 ff ), which can be relied upon in addition to existing rights and remedies 
(as envisaged by sec 2(6) CPA).20
19 See sec 6(6) and sch 1 CPA.
20 Section 2 lays down the liability for defective products. Section 2(6) reads: ‘Th is section 
shall be without prejudice to any liability arising otherwise than by virtue of this Part.’ See 
England and Wales
Intersentia 179
E. SPECIAL LIABILITY REGIMES FOR NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES
11 Th e diffi  culty with addressing the topic of special liability regimes for new 
technologies is that what is ‘new’ is of course relative. Moreover, ‘old’ special 
liability regimes exist but are capable of applying to emerging technologies in 
the industries in question. Th is is the case, for example, with respect to sec 1 of 
the Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 which imposes strict 
liability on an employer for personal injury to an employee as a result of a defect 
in equipment provided by his employer where the defect is attributable wholly or 
partly to the fault of a third party (whether identifi ed or not). Th e Act only applies 
where the damage arose in the course of the employee’s employment. Th e provision 
cannot be excluded or limited but applies without prejudice to the law relating to 
contributory negligence and any remedy by way of contribution or in contract or 
otherwise which is available to the employer in respect of the injury: sec 1. If the 
damage is caused by a 3D printer, for example, or some other ‘newly’ developed 
equipment, there is no doubt that the provision would nonetheless apply.
12 Two other, more specifi c liability regimes may also be mentioned. First, the 
Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 provides, inter alia, for the payment of a 
statutory sum by a person who is severely disabled as a result of vaccination against 
any of the diseases to which the Act applies.21 New vaccines are periodically 
developed and approved and this may involve the use of new technologies. 
However, it appears that these would still be regulated under the 1979 Act.
13 Second, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended)22 
regulates aspects of reproductive and regenerative medicine. In particular, sec 44 
amends the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act  1976 so that the latter 
provides, in its sec 1A, for a civil action for disabled children who were born ‘as 
the result of the placing in [their mother] of an embryo or of sperm and eggs or 
her artifi cial insemination’. In 2015, Parliament approved new Regulations under 
the 1990 Act that allow the practice of a novel form of reproductive medicine, 
mitochondrial donation (resulting in what are popularly known as ‘three-person 
babies’).23 Liability continues to be regulated under the Act of 1976. Th ough use 
of the new technique is the provision of a service as opposed to the supply of a 
product, the service is one which may well rely on medical products.
M Lunney/K Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials (2013) 595 for possible reasons as to why 
consumers are slow in bringing actions under the CPA.
21 Th at is, diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, poliomyelitis, measles, rubella, tuberculosis, 
smallpox, and any other disease which is specifi ed by the Secretary of State for the purposes 
of this Act by order made by statutory instrument: sec 1(2).
22 See also Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, sch 6 clause 14 f.
23 Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015.
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14 Moving on to possible reforms: in February 2015 the Department for 
Transport (DfT) published a document, ‘Th e Pathway to Driverless Cars: A 
Detailed Review of Regulations for Automated Vehicle Technologies’,24 which 
included a summary of responses to a consultation on the subject. Th e brief 
section on liability issues is reproduced here:25
‘Th e major theme throughout many of the questions posed to stakeholders was 
liability. Respondents were concerned about how liability would be apportioned in 
the event of a collision and who would take responsibility for this if the vehicle was in 
control at the time.
While many felt the existing liability regime would be suffi  cient for testing to 
go ahead, almost equal numbers foresaw problems and the need for changes to be 
made.
Th ere was general agreement that vehicle manufacturers should continue to 
be held strictly liable for mechanical and system failures as is already the case 
for emergency braking and cruise control systems. It was suggested that vehicle 
manufactures should also accept liability for the soft ware in their vehicles.
Many respondents focused on the diffi  culty of establishing whether the driver 
or the automated system was in control of the vehicle at the time of a collision or 
other event. Th e use of independent event data recorders and camera systems were 
recommended to address this.
It was suggested that thought should be given to the wider liabilities, for example 
road maintenance and information providers.’
15 Th e report also highlighted potential diffi  culties for claimants seeking to 
rely on existing rights and remedies:26
‘Due to the complexity of the technologies involved, a claimant may need to call on 
expert evidence. For example, an expert may be needed to prove to a court that a 
collision could only have happened through a malfunction of the technology and not 
by any other action of the claimant.
Equally, establishing exactly what may have been considered to be “state of the 
art” at the time of the vehicle’s development could again require detailed technical 
expertise.
Th e complexity of the technologies involved, the cost of obtaining expert 
witnesses and the potential for evidence of any manufacturing defect to be destroyed 
in a subsequent collision could mean that the chances of bringing successful product 
liability claims against automated vehicle manufacturers are limited.’
24 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/401565/
pathway-driverless-cars-main.pdf>.
25 Para 16.4 ff .
26 Para 7.48 ff  (para numbers omitted).
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16 Th e DfT concluded that there was ‘need to consider how liability would be 
decided if that vehicle is subsequently involved in a collision’27 and that some 
actions were required in relation to regulations on electric personal vehicles 
and ‘remote control’ vehicles.28 Th e target for making these amendments to 
domestic legislation is summer 2017.29 Th e need for a review of the allocation 
of civil liability between driver and manufacturer and to amend the appropriate 
legislation was echoed in the DfT’s Summary Report and Action Plan.30 In 
July 2015 the DfT issued a Code of Practice for the testing of automated vehicle 
technologies, which reads: ‘Failure to follow the Code may be relevant to 
liability in any legal proceedings. Similarly, compliance with the Code does not 
guarantee immunity from liability in such circumstances.’31
17 In other areas, there is much discussion and consensus that current product 
liability laws will need to be reviewed to ensure they are suitable for emerging 
technologies.32
II. BASIC ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY
A. OVERVIEW
18 A claimant seeking to rely upon the CPA will need to establish (as to the 
burden of proof, see no 71), subject to defences (see no 60 ff ), that a defect (see 
no 27 ff ) in a product or component thereof (see no 19 ff ) caused (see no 55 ff ) 
him damage (see no 47 ff ). Th e regime under the CPA is strict (see no 41) with 
primary liability being channelled to the producer (see no 43 f). Provision is 
made for instances where the latter cannot be identifi ed (no 45). Th e statutory 
scheme limits the categories of recoverable damages (see no 68 ff ).
27 Para 18.6.
28 Para 18.8.
29 Para 18.9.
30 Para 18 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/
401562/pathway-driverless-cars-summary.pdf>.
31 Para 1.5 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/
446316/pathway-driverless-cars.pdf>. See also the work of the Automated Driving Insurer 
Group.
32 See, for example, the discussion of nanotechnology liability in Royal Society and Royal 
Academy of Engineering, Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Opportunities and 
Uncertainties (2004), available here: <www.nanotec.org.uk/fi nalReport.htm>; and Better 
Regulation Task Force, Scientifi c Research: Innovation with Controls (2003). In a more 
specifi c context, see also BB Chatterjee, Rethinking Alcock in the New Media Age, Journal 
of European Tort Law (forthcoming), which focuses on psychiatric damage to secondary 
victims resulting from the communication of images through new technologies and media 
platforms.
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B. PRODUCT
19 As mentioned above (no 6), a ‘product’ is defi ned as goods or electricity 
and includes components and raw materials: sec 1(2)(c) CPA. Th e term ‘goods’ 
encompasses substances, growing crops and things comprised in land by virtue 
of being attached to it and any ship, aircraft  or vehicle: sec 45(1). Section 2(4) 
on the restriction of the Act’s application to processed game and agricultural 
produce has been omitted so that the Act now applies to game and agricultural 
produce, processed or otherwise, in compliance with Directive 1999/34/EC. 
Th e use of the term ‘goods’ points in the direction of tangible assets. Th us, 
it would seem that intellectual property and digital content, of themselves, 
are not envisaged as falling within it. Similarly, ‘where soft ware is supplied 
non-physically – for example, over the internet – it seems hard to escape the 
conclusion that no “product” is involved and hence there can be no liability 
[for the soft ware producer].’33 Th e physical media upon which digital content is 
recorded do, however, fall within the scope of the CPA. Moreover, it is thought 
that if ‘a malfunction or glitch in the soft ware as written causes a machine to 
malfunction and injure the claimant there will be liability [for the soft ware 
producer] under the 1987 Act.’34 Th e basis of this conclusion is an analogy 
drawn with a case before the Court of Appeal in which it was stated obiter that 
a disk including the soft ware encoded on it would be ‘goods’ for the purposes 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982.35
20 Th e Directive does not extend to pure information, service or advice.36 
However, ‘any instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing or refraining 
from doing anything with or in relation to the product’ are relevant in 
determining whether a product as a whole is defective: sec 3(2)(a) (see no 28). 
Where such instructions are printed, it is the producer of the product and not 
the person undertaking the printing that is prima facie liable for errors which 
result in damage (assuming the latter did not introduce errors that were not in 
the material sent for printing).
21 Water and gas are expressly mentioned as goods under the Act and hence 
fall within its defi nition of ‘product’.37
33 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (21st edn 2014) para 11-51. See no 14 above (on soft ware in driverless 
cars), however.
34 Ibid para 11-51.
35 St Albans City and DC v International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481, 493 per Sir Iain 
Glidewell.
36 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (fn 33) para 11–49 f. Cf St Albans City Council v ICL Ltd [1996] 4 All 
ER 481, 493 where Sir Iain Glidewell thought a book containing dangerous misinformation 
was a defective good under sec 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.
37 Section 46(1).
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22 In the case of A v Th e National Blood Authority, it was conceded that blood 
was a product within the meaning of the 1985 Directive.38 Other bodily fl uids (eg 
sperm) have been held to constitute ‘property’ within the meaning of sec 32(9)(c) of 
the Human Tissue Act 200439 and some have concluded that they are products.40 
Nevertheless, there are those who argue against such a conclusion.41 Th e same 
applies for body parts.
23 As stated in sec 45(1) CPA, things attached to land may constitute ‘products’. 
However, sec 46(3) reads: ‘the performance of any contract by the erection of any 
building or structure on any land or by the carrying out of any other building 
works shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as a supply of goods insofar as, 
but only insofar as, it involves the provision of any goods to any person by means 
of their incorporation into the building, structure or works.’ In short, buildings 
and land fall outside the scope of the Act; construction materials (eg bricks and 
mortar) fall within it.42 A further limitation is to be found in sec 46(4), which 
states that ‘references in this Act to supplying goods shall not include references 
to supplying goods comprised in land where the supply is eff ected by the creation 
or disposal of an interest in the land.’ Relief may, however, be available in the 
case of defectively constructed property under the Defective Premises Act 1972. 
In response to the Commission’s Green Paper on Liability for Defective 
Products, the UK stated that ‘construction activities are largely a service activity. 
We believe that liability for defective working practices (as opposed to the supply 
of defective products) is best considered under any separate initiative which the 
Commission may propose for defective services.’43
24 Where a component is incorporated into a movable, an action may be 
brought against the producer of the defective component or that of the fi nal 
product. Where a defective component is incorporated into an immovable, the 
claim is against the producer of the component.44
25 Craft s and customised items are included within the meaning of ‘product’ 
but a maker of such products may bring himself within the defence under 
sec 4(1)(c), for example, where the product was not supplied in the course of a 
business with a view to profi t.45
38 [2001] 3 All ER 289, at [17] per Burton J.
39 Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust [2010] QBD 1.
40 For example, Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (fn 33) para 11-49; G Howells, Th e Law of Product 
Liability (2nd edn 2007) para 4.52.
41 Stapleton (fn 15) 310.
42 Howells (fn 40) para 4.41 f.
43 United Kingdom response to the Commission’s Green Paper on Liability for Defective 
Products (fn 18) 6.
44 Howells (fn 40) para 4.71.
45 ‘Business’ includes a trade or profession and the activities of a professional or trade 
association or of a local authority or other public authority: sec 45(1) CPA.
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26 Th e proportion of the value of materials and services, and the categorisation 
of the contract as a contract of sale or one of service, are quite irrelevant. Th e 
courts will look to substance rather than form. An aspect of ‘service’ comes with 
every product. Indeed, most suppliers, importers and own branders are doing no 
more than proving a service but the CPA nonetheless provides for their liability. 
Th e only question is whether there is a ‘product’ within the meaning of the CPA 
whose defect caused damage.
C. DEFECT
27 It is for the claimant to ‘establish on the balance of probabilities that there 
was a defect in the product’.46 An inference that a particular product was 
defective may, however, be drawn under the appropriate facts.47
28 Section 3(1) CPA provides that: ‘there is a defect in a product for the 
purposes of this Part if the safety of the product is not such as persons generally are 
entitled to expect’.48 A ‘legitimate expectations test’ is thus central to the question 
of defectiveness under the CPA. A number of considerations are to be taken into 
account in determining whether a product is defective, as listed in sec 3(2). In 
particular: ‘(a) the manner in which, and purposes for which, the product has 
been marketed, its get-up, the use of any mark in relation to the product and 
any instructions for, or warnings with respect to, doing or refraining from 
doing anything with or in relation to the product; (b) what might reasonably be 
expected to be done with or in relation to the product; and (c) the time when the 
product was supplied by its producer to another …’.
29 While art  6 of the Directive, in defi ning ‘defect’, refers to ‘taking all 
circumstances into account’49 in conducting the legitimate expectations test, 
one judge has interpreted this to mean taking ‘all relevant circumstances’ into 
account,50 with the consequence that some questions – namely, the avoidability 
of the harmful characteristic in relation to precautionary measures, the 
impracticality, cost or diffi  culty of taking such measures, and the benefi t to 
society or utility of the product – would be considered irrelevant.51 Some 
have argued that an exclusionary approach to risk/utility considerations goes 
46 Foster v Biosil (2001) 59 BMLR 178 per Booth QC.
47 Ide v ATB Sales Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 424, [2009] RTR 85.
48 Emphasis added. ‘Safety’, in relation to a product, includes safety with respect to products 
comprised in that product and safety in the context of risks of damage to property, as well as 
in the context of risks of death or personal injury: sec 3(1) CPA.
49 See also sec 3(2) CPA 1987 which states that ‘all the circumstances shall be taken into 
account’ in determining whether there was a defect in a product.
50 A v Th e National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289, at [57] per Burton J.
51 A v Th e National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289, at [68] per Burton J.
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too far52 and is indeed inconsistent with other authorities. In B (A Child) v 
McDonald’s Restaurants Ltd,53 for example, utility was a factor which led the 
court to conclude that the products – hot drinks – were not defective. Similarly, 
avoidability was also a relevant consideration in fi nding the product in question 
defective in Abouzaid v Mothercare (UK) Ltd.54
30 In determining the issue of defectiveness, a distinction is drawn between 
standard and non-standard products. Th e former are products which perform as 
the producer intends and the latter are specifi c specimens which are defi cient or 
inferior in terms of safety to other products of the same or a similar series.55 It 
is the harmful characteristic in the non-standard product that causes the injury 
or damage.56 Non-standard products are not to be considered as automatically 
defective but it may be easier to prove defectiveness if the product in question 
diff ers from the standard product.57
31 Note also that the mere fact that a product is inherently dangerous – eg 
poison – does not necessarily mean that it is defective, ‘provided that the injury 
resulted from that known danger.’58 In such a case, ‘there may not need to be 
any further consideration … of whether it was safe and the level of safety to be 
legitimately expected.’59
32 Th e distinction between standard and non-standard products is thought 
to ‘serve broadly the same purpose as that which is sometimes made between 
design defects and manufacturing defects’.60 However, the CPA itself does not 
draw such a distinction and in at least one case a judge has ruled that ‘there are 
no such boxes or categories in the Directive, unlike the Th ird Restatement.’61 
Th ough criticised, there is a ruling to the eff ect that design standards are not the 
relevant benchmark since members of the public as a whole are unlikely to know 
what safety standard the product they are buying has been designed to.62 In 
particular, Howells, a leading academic commentator, writes that the approach 
taken in the case in question was weak insofar as the consumer expectation 
test focused on ‘the “actual” expectations of consumers rather than the legal 
52 Lunney/Oliphant (fn 20) 586 f.
53 [2002] EWHC 490.
54 Times, 20 February 2001.
55 Th e equivalent of ‘rogue products’ or ‘lemons’ in the US or ‘Ausreisser’ or ‘off  the road’ 
products in Germany.
56 A v Th e National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289, at [36] per Burton J.
57 A v Th e National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289, at [38] per Burton J.
58 A v Th e National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289, at [35] per Burton J.
59 A v Th e National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289, at [35] per Burton J.
60 See Lunney/Oliphant (fn 20) 588.
61 A v Th e National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289, at [39] per Burton J.
62 Pollard v Tesco Stores Ltd [2006] EWCA CIV 393, at [17] per Laws LJ.
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test that requires consideration of what the persons generally are “entitled” to 
expect.’63
33 As to defects to digital content and misleading information, see no 19 above. 
As regards electricity (which by virtue of sec 1(2) is a product under the CPA), it 
is thought that surges in current may constitute a ‘defect’.64
34 As the standard is that expected by members of the public as a whole at any 
given time, it may well be that what such members consider safe today will not 
be so considered tomorrow and vice versa.
D. MARKETING OF PRODUCT
35 Th e CPA does not use the Directive’s phrase ‘put into circulation’65 but 
instead employs the term ‘supply’. Th is has been held to mean when a product 
enters a marketing process in the form in which it is off ered to the public in 
order to be used or consumed.66
36 Th e manner in which the product was marketed is closely intertwined with 
the question of defectiveness.
37 If a defect ‘did not exist in the product at the relevant time’, this could serve 
as a valid defence under sec 4(1)(d) CPA (see no 63). Generally, the relevant time 
is the time the product, other than electricity,67 is supplied to another: sec 4(2). 
If the  defect arose before, liability may attach. As is implicit in sec  3(2)(b), 
foreseeable misuse or mishandling is a relevant consideration and this may well 
extend to improper storage or handling. But where a product is supplied with 
appropriate instructions for its use, the producer should not generally be expected 
to cater for users who throw them away or lose them.68
E. PRODUCER’S OBLIGATIONS
38 Th ough Part I of the CPA does not itself use the language of ‘duty’, it may 
be said that producers owe a strict duty to consumers and others to ensure that 
63 Howells (fn 40) para 4.151.
64 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (fn 33) para 11-49, fn 221.
65 See arts 6 and 7 of the Directive.
66 See Case 127/04, O’Byrne v Sanofi  Pasteur MSD Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 1606, 1620 f as referred to 
in O’Byrne v Aventis Pasteur MSD Ltd [2010] 1 WLR 1412, 1420 f per Lord Rodger.
67 In relation to electricity, it means the time at which it was generated, being a time before it 
was transmitted or distributed: sec 4(2) CPA.
68 Worsley v Tambrands Ltd [2000] PIQR P95.
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their products are not defective. Th e duty is implicit in the defi nition of ‘defect’ 
contained in sec 3 of the Act and shaped by the defences set out in sec 4.69 More 
concrete statements as to the obligations of a producer are provided by safety 
regulations issued by the Secretary of State under Part II of the 1987 Act, 
especially the General Product Safety Regulations 2005 (see nos 79 ff  and 83 ff ), 
though these are not decisive in determining liability issues under Part I.
F. SPECIAL PRODUCTS
39 Products which could result in congenital disabilities are given specifi c 
treatment under the CPA. Section  1 of the Congenital Disabilities (Civil 
Liability) Act 1976 provides that a person responsible for an occurrence aff ecting 
the parent of a child, which causes the child to be born disabled, will be liable to 
the child if he would have been liable in tort to the aff ected parent. Th e child’s 
claim is thus derivative and distinct from that of the parent. Th e Act does not 
apply where either or both of the parents knew the risk of their child being born 
disabled.70
40 Section 6(3) of the CPA deals with how the 1976 Act is to be given eff ect in 
relation to product liability. It provides, so far as is material, that a child born 
disabled has the right to pursue the tortfeasor under the CPA where it was a 
defective product that caused the ante-natal injury.71 Unlike under sec 1(6) of 
the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976, which permits a parent 
to exclude or limit the tortfeasor’s liability towards the child, any purported 
exclusion or limitation of liability is void as a result of secs 6(3)(c) and 7 CPA. See 
also no 67.
G. STANDARD OF LIABILITY
41 Th e CPA may be considered to establish a strict liability regime (ie one 
which requires no proof of fault on the defendant’s part). Claims under the CPA 
are therefore not claims in negligence. Nevertheless, the liability ‘is to be treated 
as liability in tort’.72 Th e wrong is complete where the elements specifi ed in the 
statute are established. Liability under the CPA is not absolute, in the sense of 
not admitting defences (no 60 ff ).
69 S Deakin/A Johnston/B Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (7th edn 2012) 615.
70 Section 1(4) (subject to exception).
71 For an example of such a claim, see Multiple Claimants v Sanofi -Synthelabo Ltd [2007] EWHC 
1860.
72 Section 6(7) CPA.
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42 Interpretation of the statutory requirements may be infl uenced by views 
as to the strictness of the liability introduced. Th us, because liability under the 
Directive is defect- as opposed to fault-based, Burton J in A v Th e National Blood 
Authority concluded that this tacitly countermanded the express wording of art 6, 
requiring consideration of all circumstances in assessing defectiveness, as this 
would open the door to a risk/utility analysis typical of negligence.73 As noted 
above (no 29), the reasoning has been criticised and Burton J may be thought to 
have gone too far in precluding any balancing at all of risk with utility.74
III. THE PERSON LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGE
43 Section 2(2) and (3) CPA deals with the persons who may be liable. While 
primary liability attaches to the producer of the product, any person who puts 
his name, trade mark or other distinguishing mark on the product, the fi rst 
commercial importer of the product into the EU for the purpose of supply or a 
supplier may also be liable. Public authorities are not excluded from the purview 
of the Act.75
44 A ‘producer’ is defi ned under sec 1(2)(a) as the person who manufactured 
a product. Th is covers both a product component and a fi nished product. In 
the case of a substance which has not been manufactured but has been won or 
abstracted, it is the person who won or abstracted it. Where a product does not 
fi t within those categories but essential characteristics are attributable to an 
industrial or other process, it is the person who carried out that process.
45 Under sec 2(3), a supplier is only liable if the person who suff ered the damage 
requests him to identify the producer, own brander or importer and he fails to do 
so within a reasonable period of time. What constitutes a ‘reasonable period of 
time’ is left  to the courts to determine. By virtue of sec 1(3) a person who supplies 
any product in which products are comprised is not treated by reason only of his 
supply of that product as supplying any of the products so comprised. Th e eff ect 
of this provision is that a supplier need only identify a producer of the entire 
product and not the producer of a specifi c defective part. Th ere is a defence for 
those who supply products otherwise than in the course of business and who do 
so otherwise than with a view to profi t: sec 4(1)(c), see no 62.
46 As arts 5 and  8 of the Directive state, the Directive applies without 
prejudice to the provisions of national law concerning the right of contribution 
73 A v Th e National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289, at [57]–[63].
74 See Lunney/Oliphant (fn 20) 586 f.
75 Section 9 CPA (referring specifi cally to the Crown). See also A v Th e National Blood Authority 
[2001] 3 All ER 289, at [42] per Burton J. Nor are non-profi t making organisations.
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or recourse. Under the CPA, where two or more persons are liable for the same 
damage, their liability is joint and several: sec  2(5). By sec 1(1) of the Civil 
Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, ‘any person liable in respect of any damage 
suff ered by another person may recover contribution from any other person 
liable in respect of the same damage (whether jointly with him or otherwise).’ 
Th e amount of the contribution recoverable from any person is as may be found 
by the court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person’s 
responsibility for the damage in question: sec 2(1) of the same Act.
IV. THE AGGRIEVED PERSON AND DAMAGE
47 Th ere is little guidance on who can bring an action under the Act. 
Presumably, any person who suff ers personal injury or any loss of or damage to 
any property (including land)76 as a result of a product defect, or the personal 
representatives of a person who dies, can do so. Section 5(5) CPA does, however, 
specifi cally mention that only a ‘person with an interest in … property’ can 
pursue an action for loss of or damage to property caused by a defective product.
48 In parallel with art  9 of the 1985 Directive, the concept of actionable 
damage is limited in a number of respect under the 1987 Act. First, while 
damage consequential upon personal injury and the other losses discussed above 
is actionable, pure economic loss is not because it does not fi t into the categories 
of damage giving rise to liability specifi ed in sec 5 CPA. Th is is in line with the 
general exclusionary rule applied in negligence actions but exceptions exist even 
there. Th e CPA admits no such exceptions. Pure economic loss is, of course, 
readily recoverable in contract.
49 Second, ‘damage to the product itself or … the loss of or any damage to the 
whole or any part of any product which has been supplied with the product in 
question comprised in it’77 is also excluded. Again, this maps onto the normal 
approach taken in negligence,78 though exceptions are sometimes suggested – 
for example, in the case of component parts of ‘complex structures’.79 Th e Act 
does not seem to allow any exception of that nature.
50 Th ird, loss of or damage to property does not extend to property which, 
at the time it is lost or damaged, was not ordinarily intended for private use, 
occupation or consumption and was not intended by the person suff ering the 
76 Section 5(1).
77 Section 5(2).
78 D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners [1989] AC 177.
79 Ibid, per Lord Bridge.
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loss or damage mainly for his own private use, occupation or consumption: 
sec  5(3).80 Domestic tort actions do not segregate business from non-business 
use of goods or other property although some torts specifi cally refer to harm to 
business interests (eg malicious falsehood), and others (eg the economic torts) 
are more likely to arise in a commercial context. In contract, the terms are 
agreed upon by the parties and there is no categorical bar to their agreeing to 
exclude liability for particular forms of damage. However, there are legislative 
controls on what can and cannot be agreed in consumer contracts, including the 
exclusion of liability.81
51 Finally, a threshold of £275 applies insofar as loss of or damage to property 
is concerned: sec  5(4). Th is refl ects the policy expressed in the recital to the 
Directive: ‘to avoid litigation in an excessive number of cases’. As the CPA applies 
without prejudice to any liability arising otherwise (sec 2(6) CPA), an action in 
negligence may still be maintained for any loss or damage excluded as a result 
of the application of the threshold. However, the onus of adducing evidence on 
fault falls on the claimant. Th e UK Government has revealed that it does not 
intend to modify the threshold, which it considers to be reasonably modest 
and does not unduly disadvantage consumers. It points out that, in most cases, 
the damage would in any case be covered by the consumer’s home insurance 
policy.82 Th ough a de minimis threshold applies generally to the compensation of 
damage under domestic law,83 the adoption of a pecuniary threshold is unusual.
52 Under domestic tort law, the type (but not the extent) of the damage must 
normally have been reasonably foreseeable.84 Th is rule of remoteness appears 
also to apply to claims under the CPA. In contract, a very substantial degree of 
probability is required.85
53 Th e issue of loss of a chance was specifi cally raised in A v Th e National 
Blood Authority.86 Th e defendants argued that they were not liable for all the 
consequences of the claimants’ blood infection but only for that damage which 
resulted from the failure to introduce surrogate testing and/or to implement 
routine screening earlier. However, Burton J refused to reduce the claimants’ 
80 See sec 5(5) ff .
81 See especially Consumer Rights Act 2015, Part 2 (Unfair Terms).
82 United Kingdom response to the Commission’s Green Paper on Liability for Defective 
Products (fn 18) 4.
83 K Oliphant, Basic Questions on Tort Law from the Perspective of England and the 
Commonwealth, in: H Koziol, Basic Questions on Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective 
(2015) no 5/119. But note that some torts (eg trespass in its various forms) are actionable 
without proof of any damage at all.
84 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd [1961] AC 388.
85 Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd, Th e Heron II [1969] 1 AC 350.
86 [2001] 3 All ER 289, at [176] ff  per Burton.
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damages by reference to any loss of chance argument. Th e judge found it 
unnecessary to address the contention of counsel for the claimants that the 
CPA does not allow claims for loss of a chance because they are claims for 
pure economic loss, which is not damage for which liability can arise under 
sec  5(1)  CPA, or counsel’s further submission, referring to Hotson v East 
Berkshire Health Authority,87 that the issue in personal injury cases is simply one 
of causation, and thus results in either total success or total failure.88
54 As indicated in no 08, the UK legislature did not exercise the option of 
capping the defendant’s potential liability.
V. CAUSALITY
55 Section 2(1) CPA imposes liability ‘where any damage is caused wholly or 
partly by a defect in a product’ (emphasis added). It is ‘unnecessary to ascertain 
the cause of the defect’.89 It is, however, for the claimant to prove on a balance of 
probabilities that a defect had caused the damage sustained.
56 Th e theory of proportional liability under the CPA is yet to be ruled upon by 
the English courts.90 But in answering the question in the Commission’s Green 
Paper on Liability for Defective Products whether ‘market share liability’ would 
be feasible for cases in which there are several producers of the same product 
and it is not possible to identify the producer of the product in question, the 
UK argued that such a concept was superfl uous since, if the producer cannot be 
identifi ed, the liability falls on the supplier. It also warned that the introduction 
of market share liability ‘would have far reaching consequences for producers 
and might discourage record keeping for traceability purposes.’91 Th e cognate 
issue of loss of a chance has already been broached in no 53 and, as it is best 
regarded as relating to the defi nition of damage rather than causation, is not 
pursued further here.
57 All relevant circumstances can be taken into consideration in determining 
the cause of the damage. Domestic rules on causation apply. English law 
proceeds on the basis of both factual and legal causation. Factual causation is 
87 [1987] AC 750.
88 As to why this is the case, see McGregor on Damages (19th edn 2014) Chapter 10.
89 Ide v ATB Sales Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 424, at [19] per Th omas LJ.
90 On proportional liability in English law see K Oliphant, Causal Uncertainty and Proportional 
Liability in England and Wales, in: I Gilead/MD Green/BA Koch (eds), Proportional Liability: 
Analytical and Comparative Perspectives (2013).
91 United Kingdom response to the Commission’s Green Paper on Liability for Defective 
Products (fn 18) 3.
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generally approached under the ‘but for’ test, though there are exceptions. 
Where there are two or more acts or events which would each be suffi  cient to 
bring about the claimant’s injury but the claimant is unable to prove which 
act or event in fact caused the loss (ie multiple concurrent or alternative 
causes), a broader view of causation may be taken on grounds of fairness 
and reasonableness. In such cases, it is suffi  cient to show that the defendant’s 
conduct ‘materially contributed’ to the claimant’s injury92 or to the risk of the 
same.93 In the case of overtaken causes – that is, where a claimant is injured by 
a defendant’s negligence but prior to trial suff ers similar loss as a result of an 
independent supervening event – the initial injury may still be considered the 
cause of the damage and damages will be awarded against the initial defendant 
where the supervening event was tortious; otherwise the supervening event 
is treated as a risk within the claimant’s sphere and curtails the defendant’s 
liability.94 Where the successive event is hypothetical rather than actual, a 
reduction of damages will ensue.95
58 As regards legal causation, a voluntary intervening act of a third party 
breaks the chain of causation unless the defendant was under an exceptional 
duty to protect against third-party interference.96 No hard and fast rules can 
be laid down as to lawful or negligent intervening acts of a third party.97 As 
regards an involuntary intervening act of a third party, the starting point is to ask 
whether the intervention was reasonably foreseeable. If it was, liability is likely 
to stick. In the case of intervening events, the position is that ‘[w]here the event is 
dependent upon the defendant’s act in the sense that it would not have occurred 
had the defendant not acted as he did, the defendant will be liable for all the 
damage.’98
59 Where the aggrieved party contributes to the damage in question, recourse 
may be had to the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945: see 
sec 6(4) CPA. Similar rules of thumb as are stated above in respect of intervening 
acts of a third party apply to intervening acts by the claimant. A claimant 
cannot be found to have been 100% contributorily negligent.99 In exceptional 
circumstances, however, the (full) defence of volenti non fi t iniuria may apply.100
92 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613.
93 McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1; Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd 
[2003] 1 AC 32.
94 Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467; Jobling v Associated Dairies [1982] AC 794.
95 Heil v Rankin [2001] QB 272. See McGregor (fn 88) para 6-040.
96 See Lamb v Camden LBC [1981] 2 All ER 408.
97 McGregor (fn 88) paras 6-040 and 6-046.
98 Ibid para 6-072.
99 Pitts v Hunt [1990] All ER 344.
100 See, in a diff erent context, Morris v Murray [1991] 2 QB 6.
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VI. DEFENCES AND EXCLUSIONS
60 Section 4 CPA implements the defences specifi ed in art 7 of the Directive. 
Under sec 4(1)(a) it is a defence if the ‘defect is attributable to compliance with 
any requirement imposed by or under any enactment’ or with any EU obligation. 
In practice, most legislation tends to set minimum standards whereas the 
defence only applies in respect of mandatory obligations.101 Insofar as domestic 
legislation goes, the provision applies to ‘enactments’; consequently, voluntary 
standards set by bodies governing particular industries do not count.102
61 By sec 4(1)(b), it is a defence if ‘the person proceeded against did not at any 
time supply the product to another’. Th e rule seeks to protect producers in such 
circumstances as ‘where accidents occur before distribution or where products 
are stolen and supplied through irregular channels.’103
62 Section 4(1)(c) applies where the defendant’s supply of products was neither 
in the course of a business nor with a view to profi t (see also no 45). In Henning 
Veedfald v Århus Amtskommune, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) made it 
clear that the equivalent provision in the Directive (art 7(c)) does not exclude a 
defective product which is manufactured and used in the course of providing 
a specifi c medical service, fi nanced entirely from public funds, for which the 
injured patient is not required to pay any contribution. Th e fact that a product 
is manufactured for a specifi c medical service that is fi nanced from public funds 
maintained out of taxpayers’ contributions cannot detract from the economic 
and business character of that manufacture.104
63 We have already considered the exculpatory ground under sec 4(1)(d) (see 
no 37). Th e defence seeks to exclude liability where ‘the defect did not exist in 
the product at the relevant time’105 and is quite broad in its application. Piper 
v JRI (Manufacturing) Ltd concerned an allegedly defective prosthesis that was 
implanted into the claimant’s right hip.106 It was held there that it was suffi  cient 
to show that the manufacturing and inspection process was such that any 
imperfections would have been identifi ed before the fi nal inspection process. 
On the facts, the court inferred that the defect would have been detected had it 
been present prior to delivery at the hospital, a decision upheld on appeal. Th e 
effi  cacy of this defence is further illustrated by the recent case of Love v Halfords 
101 Howells (fn 40) para 4.252.
102 Ibid para 4.252.
103 Ibid para 4.256.
104 Case C-203/99, [2001] ECR I-3569, at [19] ff .
105 See no 37 on the meaning of the relevant time.
106 [2006] EWCA Civ 1344.
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Ltd.107 Th e claimant there alleged that his bicycle’s steerer tube was defective 
and thus caused him to lose control and fall, sustaining very serious injuries. In 
connection with the sec 4(1)(d), the evidential burden fell upon the defendant 
to show that there was no defect in the steerer tube at the point of sale but was 
discharged on the facts: as a matter of reasonable inference from the scientifi c 
evidence, there was nothing defective about the steerer tube, its design, assembly 
or the steel from which it was made.108 Rather, the evidence was that ‘some 
accident in the nature of a collision, or aggressive jumping or similar riding on 
the bike involving the placing of excessive bending force on the tube took place 
and there was a botched attempt to repair it which made it worse.’109
64 Sec 4(1)(e) enacts the development risk defence. A person is not liable if ‘the 
state of scientifi c and technical knowledge at the relevant time was not such that 
a producer of products of the same description as the product in question might 
be expected to have discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while 
they were under his control’. Th e inclusion of the above defence is said to be 
justifi ed by a number of considerations, ‘such as encouragement of technological 
innovation, keeping down insurance costs, preserving a competitive advantage 
and (no doubt) to protect the pharmaceutical industry.’110 Whether sec 4(1)(e) 
accords to its corresponding provision in the Directive was the question in 
Commission v United Kingdom. Advocate General Tesauro elucidated in his 
Opinion in the case, and the ECJ agreed, that the defence refers solely to ‘scientifi c 
and technical knowledge’, not safety standards in use in the industry, at the time 
the product was put into circulation.111 Th e Court further ruled that the defence 
does not contemplate the state of knowledge of which the producer in question 
was actually or subjectively in or could have been apprised. Rather, the test 
is objective: the state of scientifi c and technical knowledge, including the most 
advanced level of such knowledge at the time the product was put into circulation, 
of which the producer is presumed to have been informed. Only serious or 
scientifi c opinions are relevant. Th e Court went on to add that the relevant 
scientifi c and technical knowledge must have been accessible at the time when 
the product was put into circulation. To illustrate the requirement of accessibility, 
the Advocate General gave the example of research carried out by an academic in 
Manchuria published in a local scientifi c journal in Chinese as knowledge which 
would not be accessible because the information does not circulate outside the 
boundaries of the region. In A v Th e National Blood Authority, Burton J thought 
that ‘the right approach is to look at “accessibility” and to regard as Manchuria 
perhaps an unpublished document or unpublished research not available to 
107 [2014] EWHC 1057, [2014] RTR 470.
108 [2014] EWHC 1057, at [50] per Sir Colin Mackay.
109 [2014] EWHC 1057, at [49] per Sir Colin Mackay.
110 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (fn 33) para 11-71.
111 Case C-300/95 [1997] ECR I-2649, at [26] ff .
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the general public, retained within the laboratory or research department of 
a particular company.’112 In that case, the claimants had argued that, once the 
defect in blood is known, it is a known risk and a known risk does not qualify 
under the defence even if it is unavoidable. Burton J agreed but added that if the 
risk is one within the legitimate expectations of the public at large it might bear 
on the separate issue of whether the product was defective.113 On the facts, the 
defence was found not to be applicable and the defendant’s liability stuck.
65 Finally, it is a defence under sec 4(1)(f) if the defect constituted a defect in a 
subsequent product in which the original product was comprised and the defect 
was wholly attributable to the design of the subsequent product or to compliance 
by the producer of the product in question with instructions given by the 
producer of the subsequent product.
66 It is for the defendant to prove his case when relying upon the above 
defences, hence the reference to ‘for him to show’ in sec 4(1) of the CPA. Th is 
can also be inferred from the recital of Directive 85/374/EEC, which reads: ‘a fair 
apportionment of risk between the injured person and the producer implies that 
the producer should be able to free himself from liability if he furnishes proof as 
the existence of certain exonerating circumstances’.114
67 Section 7 CPA prohibits the exclusion or restriction of liability.115 Any term 
or notice purporting to have such eff ect would thus be invalid.
VII. REMEDIES
68 Damages are available for damage to the interests specifi ed in no 47  ff 
above. English courts do not allow the reduction of the claimant’s award by 
reference to the defendant’s economic position or on other equitable grounds. 
It is very unlikely that punitive or exemplary damages could be awarded under 
the CPA, given the 1985 Directive’s foundation on the need to approximate 
national laws.116 Such a conclusion is also consistent with the lack of express 
112 [2001] 3 All ER 289, at [49].
113 For criticisms of this aspect of the decision see Lunney/Oliphant (fn 20) 594 f.
114 Emphasis added. See also Love v Halfords Ltd [2014] EWHC 1057, at [25] f per Sir Colin Mackay.
115 ‘Th e liability of a person by virtue of this Part to a person who has suff ered damage caused 
wholly or partly by a defect in a product, or to a dependant or relative of such a person, shall 
not be limited or excluded by any contract term, by any notice or by any other provision.’
116 On the availability of such damages in England and in Continental Europe generally, see 
H Koziol/V Wilcox, Punitive Damages: Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives (2009). See 
also Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (fn 33) para 11-84.
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mention of the availability of such damages in the CPA and the non-availability 
of exemplary (and indeed aggravated) damages in the tort of negligence.117
69 An action lies under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 in the case of death. 
Bereavement damages are available to a fi xed category of eligible persons 
(including the spouse of the deceased).118 A fi xed statutory sum, currently set 
at £12,980, is paid.119 Any damage for which a person is liable under sec 2 of the 
CPA is deemed to have been caused, for the purposes of the 1976 Act, by that 
person’s wrongful act, neglect or default: sec 6(1)(a) CPA. See no 71.
70 It is not possible to seek an injunction in respect of a defective product 
under the CPA. Th e UK Government has said that it ‘do[es] not see a case for 
extending the right of a consumer to seek an injunction if injured by a defective 
product. We feel this goes beyond the aims of the Directive. And furthermore, 
such a change would fundamentally alter the present safety regime for products. 
It is not clear what benefi t this would have for consumers or businesses.’120 
Th e UK Government also has no plans to introduce a special compensation 
scheme for the victims of defective products in cases where the development 
risks defence applies and has noted that it would ‘be diffi  cult to assess the likely 
demand on such a fund.’121
VIII. PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIAL ISSUES
71 Although not expressly stated under the CPA, a claimant is required to 
prove certain aspects of his case (including the existence of a defect, causation 
and damage: see nos 27 ff , 55 ff  and 47 ff  respectively) as is a defendant as 
regards the available defences (see no 60 ff ). As in all civil proceedings, the 
standard of proof is the balance of probabilities (see nos 27 and 55). In applying 
this standard, the court may be prepared to work on the basis of inferences, as 
mentioned under nos 27 and 63 above.
72 Schedule 1 CPA amended the Limitation Act 1980 in its application in 
relation to the bringing of actions under Part I CPA. In the case of defective 
products, the relevant period is three years from the date on which the cause 
of action accrued and the date of knowledge of the injured person or, in the 
117 Kralj v McGrath [1986] 1 All ER 54 (aggravated damages); Kuddus v Chief Constable of 
Leicestershire [2001] UKHL 29 [2002] 2 AC 122, at [122] per Lord Scott (exemplary damages).
118 Section 1A(2). See proposed changes under the Negligence and Damages Bill 2015–16.
119 Section 1A(3).
120 United Kingdom response to the Commission’s Green Paper on Liability for Defective 
Products (fn 18) 7.
121 Ibid 4.
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case of loss of or damage to property, the date of knowledge of the plaintiff  or 
(if earlier) of any person in whom his cause of action was previously vested, 
whichever is the later.122 In the case of death the period is three years from the 
date of death or the date of the personal representative’s knowledge, whichever 
is the later.123 Th ere is a long-stop period of ten years from the relevant time (as 
to which see no 37).124 In response to the question in the Commission’s Green 
Paper of whether the latter period would benefi t from modifi cation, the UK 
Government stated that sympathy lay with those who advocate increasing the 
period of liability as some injuries (such as BSE) have long incubation periods 
and may appear later than ten years aft er the product was supplied; however, it 
felt that doubling the period, for example, would add signifi cantly to business 
costs and would bear particularly heavily on smaller enterprises. It was also 
concerned about the practicability of deciding to which sectors to apply longer 
time limits. Finally, it added that such an added layer of complexity would not be 
in the interests of business or consumers.125
IX. ALTERNATIVE REGULATIONS AND REMEDIES
A. CONSEQUENCES OF PURSUING DOMESTIC REMEDIES
73 As mentioned in no 10, an action in contract and tort may be brought 
alongside or instead of one under the CPA, provided only that the claimant does 
not recover damages several times over. A claimant will be advised as to which 
course to pursue in light of the precise circumstances of his case.
74 Strict liability is the default rule in contract unless the contract imposes a 
fault standard (so that a contractual duty of care arises). Th e alternative action 
in tort will generally be in respect of negligence, which as its name suggests 
requires fault. It is noteworthy that English courts have generally refused to rely 
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in domestic product liability cases to infer 
negligence from the very nature of an accident or injury (cf no 27).126 However, in 
Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd, a case in which a claimant who contracted 
dermatitis alleged that this was the result of wearing a woollen garment in which 
122 Limitation Act 1980, sec 11A(4). ‘Personal injuries’ includes any disease and any impairment 
of a person’s physical or mental condition, and ‘injury’ and cognate expressions shall be 
construed accordingly: sec 38(1) Limitation Act 1980.
123 Limitation Act 1980, sec 11A(5).
124 Limitation Act 1980, sec 11A(3).
125 United Kingdom response to the Commission’s Green Paper on Liability for Defective 
Products (fn 18) 5.
126 Mason v Williams & Williams Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 549, 551 f per Finnemore J. See also Evans v 
Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd [1936] 1 All ER 283.
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excess sulphites were found, the Privy Council ruled that: ‘If excess sulphites 
were left  in the garment, that could only be because some one was at fault  … 
Negligence is found as a matter of inference from the existence of the defects taken 
in connection with all the known circumstances: even if the manufacturers could 
by apt evidence have rebutted that inference they have not done so.’127 In eff ect, 
therefore, the same outcome is reached as if res ipsa loquitur had been applied. A 
more concrete advantage in pursuing one’s claim in negligence (or in contract) 
is that such actions are not limited to products but rather they can extend, inter 
alia, to services – for example, damage arising from hire-purchase agreements 
or from those who conduct repair or installation work (see also the liability for 
misstatements in no 76).128 Th is is not the case under the CPA (see no 20 above). 
Also, unlike the CPA which is eff ectively limited to protecting consumers, most 
actions in contract and tort extend to business claimants.
75 Th e diffi  culty arising from the doctrine of privity of contract is somewhat 
alleviated by the Contracts (Rights of Th ird Parties) Act 1999, which entitles 
third parties to enforce a term of a contract if the contract expressly provides 
that they may or if the term purports to confer a benefi t on them. Th is is no help 
to a bystander, however (cf an action in tort). Moreover, where goods are sold via 
a distribution chain, liability is prima facie limited to the immediate contracting 
party and does not automatically extend to the manufacturer. While the seller 
will invariably have a contract with the supplier and he with his supplier until the 
contractual chain reaches back to the manufacturer, suing along a contractual 
chain is not altogether effi  cient. Moreover, a diffi  culty arises where one party 
in the chain has ceased to trade for whatever reason or is uninsured, out of 
the jurisdiction or can benefi t from an exclusion clause.129 Admittedly, certain 
warranties are implied into contracts for sale in the course of business (see 
no 03) including correspondence with quality or fi tness and sample supplied.130 
Yet this is not the case where (for example) a fault was specifi cally drawn to the 
buyer’s attention before the contract was made and/or would have been apparent 
on a reasonable examination in the case of a sale by sample.131 Nonetheless, the 
127 [1936] AC 85, 101 per Lord Wright (emphasis added).
128 Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (fn 69) 610.
129 Ibid 608.
130 See sec 14 f of the Sale of Goods Act 1979; sec 10 f of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 
1973; secs 4 f and 9 f of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1985. In the case of consumers 
see, among others, secs 9 f and 13 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
131 On implied terms about quality or fi tness see, for example, sec 14(2C)(a) of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979; sec 10(2C)(a) of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 and secs 4(3)(c) and 9(3)(c) 
of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1985. In the case of sale by sample see secs 14(2C)(c) 
and 15(2)(c) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979; secs 10(2C)(c) and 11(1)(c) of the Supply of Goods 
(Implied Terms) Act 1973 and secs 4(3)(c), 5(2)(c), 9(3)(c) and 10(2)(c) of the Supply of Goods 
and Services Act 1982. In the case of consumers see, among others, sec 9(4)(a) of the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015 on satisfactory quality and secs 9(4)(a) and 13(2) on sale by sample.
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eff ect of implied terms is that a purchaser is protected in contract even if the 
goods were not ‘unsafe’ and thus caused no damage but were merely shoddy. 
Purchasers also benefi t from a statutory presumption that goods which do not 
conform to the contract of sale within a period of six months from the date of 
delivery are taken not to have conformed to it on that day.132
76 Should one choose to seek redress in the form of an action for breach of 
contract or tort, one ‘lets in all the consequences of that form of action.’133 Th e 
aim of contractual damages is to put the non-breaching party in the position 
he would have occupied had the contract been fulfi lled, while that in tort is 
the restoration of the status quo ante (more exactly: putting the victim in the 
position he would have been in had the tort not occurred). An advantageous 
consequence in both cases is the availability of damages for pure economic 
loss (cf CPA, no 48). In tort, however, such losses are mostly restricted to cases 
where one can establish a relationship of proximity through an assumption 
of responsibility by the defendant to the claimant. A ‘defective’ or negligently 
made statement may fall within the so-called Hedley Byrne exception, thus 
entitling a successful claimant to such damages.134 Damage to the product itself 
is also recoverable in contract and (perhaps) in tort. Exemplary and aggravated 
damages can be pursued under (some) torts. A greater number of defences also 
exist, for example exclusion of liability in tort and duress and frustration in 
contract.
77 One who frames his action in contract can seek to rely upon general 
contractual remedies such as rescission and specifi c performance. Moreover, 
certain statutory remedies serve to benefi t consumers: by sec 24 of the 
Consumer Protection Act 2015, for example, a right to require the seller 
to repair or replace the problematic goods or to require him to reduce the 
purchase price is implied.
78 In addition, restitutionary remedies may be sought as a basis for redress 
in contract and tort, though this option is not oft en available and is seldom 
pursued. An injunction can also be sought in contract but not in tort claims 
based on negligence.
132 See Consumer Rights Act 2015, sec 19(14). Th e provision does not apply if it is established that 
the goods did so conform to the contract on that day or its application is incompatible with 
the nature of the goods or with how they fail to conform to the contract.
133 Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488, 496 per Lord Atkinson.
134 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. See also liability under the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967.
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B. DUTY TO RECALL
79 Th e CPA does not itself provide for a producer’s liability for damage caused 
by its failure to recall a dangerous product, but in appropriate circumstances a 
duty to recall and a corresponding liability for breach of that duty can arise at 
common law.135 In practice, the content of that duty is likely to be shaped by the 
regulations relating to recall notices (considered below).
80 Regulation  15 of the General Product Safety Regulations 2005 deals 
specifi cally with recall notices. Subregulation 1 reads: ‘where an enforcement 
authority has reasonable grounds for believing that a product is a dangerous 
product and that it has already been supplied or made available to consumers, 
the authority may serve a notice (“a recall notice”) requiring the person on 
whom it is served to use his reasonable endeavours to organise the return of the 
product from consumers to that person or to such other person as is specifi ed in 
the notice.’ Regulation 2 defi nes an ‘enforcement authority’ as ‘the Secretary of 
State, any other Minister of the Crown in charge of a government department, 
any such department and any authority or council mentioned in regulation 
10’.136 A ‘product’ is rather wordily described in reg  2. In short, any product 
intended or likely to be used by consumers, whether or not this was paid for, 
is covered. Th e provision extends to both new and second-hand products 
but is restricted to items supplied in the course of a commercial activity.137 
A ‘dangerous product’ is defi ned as a product other than a safe product, and a 
‘safe product’ means ‘a product which, under normal or reasonably foreseeable 
conditions of use including duration and, where applicable, putting into 
service, installation and maintenance requirements, does not present any risk 
or only the minimum risks compatible with the product’s use, considered to be 
acceptable and consistent with a high level of protection for the safety and health 
of persons’: reg 2. In determining the foregoing, the following shall be taken 
into account: ‘(a) the characteristics of the product, including its composition, 
packaging, instructions for assembly and, where applicable, instructions for 
installation and maintenance, (b) the eff ect of the product on other products, 
where it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used with other products, (c) the 
135 Rivtow Marine Ltd v Washington Iron Works [1974] SCR 1189 (Canadian Supreme Court).
136 Ie a county council, district council, London Borough Council, the Common Council of the 
City of London in its capacity as a local authority: reg 10(4).
137 Th e precise defi nition is: ‘a product which is intended for consumers or likely, under 
reasonably foreseeable conditions, to be used by consumers even if not intended for them 
and which is supplied or made available, whether for consideration or not, in the course of a 
commercial activity and whether it is new, used or reconditioned and includes a product that 
is supplied or made available to consumers for their own use in the context of providing a 
service. “Product” does not include equipment used by service providers themselves to supply 
a service to consumers, in particular equipment on which consumers ride or travel which is 
operated by a service provider’.
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presentation of the product, the labelling, any warnings and instructions for 
its use and disposal and any other indication or information regarding the 
product, and (d) the categories of consumers at risk when using the product, in 
particular children and the elderly. Th e feasibility of obtaining higher levels of 
safety or the availability of other products presenting a lesser degree of risk shall 
not constitute grounds for considering a product to be a dangerous product’.
81 A recall notice may only be issued in specifi c instances, namely where: 
‘(a)  other action which an enforcement authority may require under [the 
General Product Safety Regulations 2005] would not suffi  ce to prevent the risks 
concerned to the health and safety of persons, (b) the action being undertaken 
by the producer or the distributor concerned in fulfi lment of his obligations 
under these Regulations is unsatisfactory or insuffi  cient to prevent the risks 
concerned to the health and safety of persons, and (c) the authority has given 
not less than seven days notice to the person on whom the recall notice is to be 
served of its intention to serve such a notice and where that person has before the 
expiry of that period by notice required the authority to seek the advice of such 
person as the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators determines on the questions 
of – (i) whether the product is a dangerous product, (ii) whether the issue of a 
recall notice is proportionate to the seriousness of the risk, and the authority 
has taken account of such advice’: reg 15(4). Th e details of what the recall notice 
may require are stated in reg  15(2). Where an enforcement authority has been 
unable to identify any person on whom to serve a recall notice, or the person 
on whom such a notice has been served has failed to comply with it, then the 
authority may itself take such action as could have been required by a recall 
notice: reg 15(9). In the latter case, the authority may recover from the person 
on whom the notice was served summarily as a civil debt, any costs or expenses 
reasonably incurred by it: reg 15(10).138 Of course, a person who has suff ered 
personal injury or property damage as a result of using the dangerous product 
may pursue a civil action against the producer, etc, of the product under the CPA, 
among other avenues. However, reg 42 states that the Regulations shall not be 
construed as conferring any right of action in civil proceedings in respect of any 
loss or damage suff ered in consequence of a contravention of these Regulations. 
As noted above, the Regulations may yet be relevant in construing the content 
of the common law duty to recall. Further, the authority may be liable to pay 
compensation to a person on whom an improper notice was served in respect 
of any loss or damage suff ered by reason of the notice: reg 16. Criminal liability 
may ensue for the contravention of various provisions under the Regulations: 
reg 20 (see no 83 f).
138 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, sec 58.
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C. SOCIAL SECURITY
82 A person injured by a defective product would of course be entitled to rely 
on his social security rights. In particular, he may seek free medical consultation 
before a practitioner that is contracted by the National Health Service (NHS) 
and he may also seek free NHS hospital treatment. Th e NHS has a (capped) 
right of recourse against the tortfeasor under sec 150 of the Health and Social 
Care (Communities Health Standards) Act 2003, a task undertaken by the 
Department for Work and Pensions’ Compensation Recovery Unit (CRU). An 
injured person could also be entitled to other social security benefi ts, for example 
disability benefi ts. Th e value of such benefi ts may be liable to recoupment by the 
CRU on behalf of the Secretary of State under the Social Security (Recovery of 
Benefi ts) Act 1997.
D. CRIMINAL OFFENCES
83 A whole host of potential criminal off ences can arise in connection 
with defective products. In the case of death or personal injury, these include 
manslaughter and causing actual bodily harm (ABH). Companies may be liable 
under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. Th ere is 
no individual liability under that Act; therefore, the penalty is limited to a fi ne, 
albeit of unlimited amount. A director or employee could also be liable for the 
common law off ence of manslaughter, but this is unlikely in the product liability 
context. Th e General Product Safety Regulations 2005 also establish a number 
of criminal off ences. In addition to the criminal liability for breach of the 
regulations on recall notices discussed above (see no 79 ff ), it may be noted that 
a person who contravenes reg 5 (placement of an unsafe product on the market), 
inter alia, is guilty of an off ence and may be punished by fi ne, imprisonment or 
both: reg 20(1). A defence of due diligence (ie that the person took all reasonable 
steps and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the off ence) exists 
under reg 29.
84 Th e Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 supplements the General Product 
Safety Regulations 2005 which do not apply in the case of products used in the 
workplace. Section 6 of the 1974 Act imposes a duty on any person who designs, 
manufactures, imports or supplies any article for use at work or any article of 
fairground equipment, inter alia, to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, 
that the article is safe and without risks to health. In addition to civil liability 
under sec 47, breach of the above duty is also an off ence under sec 33 and is 
punishable by fi ne, imprisonment or both.
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E. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
85 Relevant government authorities are also equipped with administrative 
powers under the General Product Safety Regulations 2005 including the power 
to suspend sale (reg 11), organise appropriate checks on the safety properties of 
a product (reg 21) and to enter and search business premises connected with the 
production of a product (reg 22).
X. ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC LAW
86 It took 12 years aft er its entry into force for a claim resulting in a reported 
judgment to be brought under the CPA. Th is notwithstanding, an increasing 
number of persons seek to rely upon the Act; this is more a trickle than it is a 
fl ood, though. Moreover, such actions have been pursued with various degrees 
of success.
87 Several reasons have been posited as to why the scale of product-related 
litigation under the Act has not taken off  as expected, including the Act’s 
limited scope. Th ere might be advantages of suing in tort (eg where a product 
was not put into circulation) or for defects in quality in contract (since the seller 
is more likely to be local). Th ere is also evidence in the UK that consumers 
have always been less active in respect of damage by defective products. An 
empirical examination of pre- and post-implementation data could confi rm the 
generally held view that claims consciousness is localised to specifi c wrongs. 
Expenses involved (eg for discovery of documents and experts) as well as to 
the infl uence of the legal profession, as gatekeepers of the courts, are other 
explanations. Regard must be had, in the former case, to the restriction of 
contingency fees to or their predominance in select areas, for example personal 
injury at work or on the road. Th e availability of non-legal avenues is a further 
factor. It is also very likely that a large proportion of claims settle informally 
out of court.139
88 As to the question of whether the Directive has been correctly implemented 
in national law, the litigation by the Commission (see no 64) illustrates that 
the latter had some reservations. However, the ECJ did not consider the 
UK implementing legislation to be manifestly contrary to the Directive, at 
least insofar as the defence under art  7(e) of the Product Liability Directive 
was concerned, but it did give guidance as to how it considered it should be 
interpreted. Indeed, at least one commentator has said that the CPA ‘probably 
139 See Lunney/Oliphant (fn 20) 595 for further details.
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represents the truest implementation’ of the 1985 Directive among the major EU 
Member States.140
89 In the authors’ view, the defi nition of a ‘product’ does seem apt to cover the 
new technologies specifi cally discussed in the introduction to this book. Th at is 
not to say, however, that claimants would not face diffi  culties in proving certain 
aspects of their claim.
140 W van Gerven/J Lever/P Larouche, Cases, Material and Text on National, Supranational and 
International Tort Law (2000) 668.
